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In her paper “The depressive situation”
Jacobs (2013) stresses the role of nor-
mative evaluative and narrative processes
in what creates the lived experience of
depression. These “evaluative dynamics”
are seen to emerge out of an “interplay
of pre-reflective and reflective processes,”
which are claimed as being “significantly
altered in depression.” Even if acknowledg-
ing a pre-reflective level of the processes
of evaluative self- and world-disclosure,
Jacobs argues that this “cannot be reduced
to or equated with a mere affective (or:
“felt”) dimension.” Jacobs’ philosophical
analysis ties in a way on the cognitive inter-
pretation of depression that has prevailed
since the 60s especially due to the work of
Aron Beck and the development of cog-
nitive psychotherapy for depression (Beck,
1975, 1979; Clark et al., 1999). However,
Jacobs well admits that affectivity provides
a mode of an evaluative process.
Interestingly - and in contrast to Jacob’s
theory -, this affective, felt, dimension
had once been considered as absolutely
crucial for the “depressive situation.” But
this was long before the cognitive turn in
psychology overwhelmed psychiatry.
So, my comment just wants to remind
of the role of affectivity, or more precisely
what was called “self-feeling,” in the very
early theories of depression and mental
disorder that were formulated at the begin-
nings of psychiatry as a medical discipline.
SELF-FEELING AS Gemeingefühl
The English term “self-feeling” was intro-
duced into psychiatry by Alexander
Crichton in his “Inquiry into the Nature
and Origin of Mental Derangement”
as a translation of the German “phys-
iological” notion “‘Selbst-gefühl’ and
‘Gemeingefühl”’ (Crichton, 1798, p.
113). “Physiological,” because in Johann
Christian Reil’s theory of “Gemeingefühl”
as the somatic foundation of self-
consciousness, mood, temper, volition
and behavior - “corresponding exactly to
the feelings that we call the temperament
of persons” - self-feeling was thought of as
emerging primarily only from the physio-
logical arrangement of the nervous system
(Reil, 1794/1817, pp. 83–84).
SELF-FEELING AS Selbstgefühl
The philosophical notion “Selbstgefühl”
had already been introduced by Johann
Bernhard Basedow in 1764 with refer-
ence to Locke as the translation of “inner
sense” (Drüe, 1994) and was embraced
with enthusiasm in philosophical discus-
sions in the 1770 about self-consciousness
and its relation to some sort of inner
sense – crystallizing within a single notion
the romantic idea of the primary impor-
tance of feeling (Frank, 2002). The affective
structure of self-feeling in contrast to pure
somatic perceptual or, on the contrary, the
cognitive meaning of self-feeling as inner
sense was repeatedly stressed.
Self-feeling was thought as the most
basic and primordial sense of subjectiv-
ity, as the direct experience of existence:
a feeling of being, an existential feeling.
In this line, the term “Selbstgefühl” had
also been chosen as the translation of the
French “sentiment de soi-même,” a feel-
ing inseparable of the feeling of existence,
“sens intime de l’existence” or “sentiment
de notre propre existence” as it was called
also by Rousseau and the Encyclopaedists
(Frank, 2002, p. 79f). Remarkably, both
these notions (“feelings of being” and
“existential feeling”) are today used by
phenomenologist Matthew Ratcliffe espe-
cially in reference to a phenomenological
analysis of depression (see Ratcliffe, 2008;
Slaby and Stephan, 2008).
Moreover, romantic philosophers
stressed the relation of “Selbstgefühl” to
the latin “sensus sui ipsius” that, in the stoic
tradition, denotes a self-feeling that every
sentient living being has by nature as an
integral affective component of its striving
for self-preservation. In its very striving,
an animal displays a background orien-
tation towards its own life as something
worth preserving (Frank, 2002, p. 28).
SELF-FEELING, PHYSIOLOGY, AND
MENTAL DISORDER
Even if there was a vivid debate between
philosophers, romantic physicians and
psychiatrists concerning the correct theo-
retical explication and especially the bio-
logical basis of self-feeling, it was seen
mostly as layered in itself, Gemeingefühl
being the lowest most primitive form
(Burdach, 1828, p. 166). In its higher lev-
els, self-feeling was to include such back-
ground longlasting feelings as mood and
temper. In this line, the 1845 textbook
“Principles of Medical Psychology” - writ-
ten by the romantic psychiatrist Ernst
Freiherr von Feuchtersleben who coined in
this context the term “psycho-somatic” -
explains:
“Self-feeling unifies sensation and rep-
resentation. In self-feeling, subjectivity
permeates the organic body; it is what
we mean when saying “I” and it pro-
vides the ground for all other feelings
and emotions. Within self-feeling, the
Gemeingefühl takes on a human char-
acter. The pleasantness of the latter is
transformed into cheerfulness, displea-
sure into sadness, the changing and
interplay of these states is called mood
and so it comes that human weal
and woe exist trough this channel of
inner life.” (von Feuchtersleben, 1845,
pp. 137–138).
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SELF-FEELING AND DEPRESSION
Introduced by romantic psychiatry, the
idea of self-feelings being diminished in
depression had been central to early
German and French psychiatry.
Already in the first edition of his psy-
chiatric textbook, “The Pathology and
Therapy of Mental Diseases,” Wilhelm
Griesinger noted that “especially melan-
cholic’s” complain of a “kind of anaes-
thesia: I see, I hear, I feel, they say, but
the object does not reach me; I cannot
receive the sensation; it seems to me as
if there was a wall between me and the
external world”(Griesinger, 1845, p. 67).
Griesinger thought this form of emotional
anaesthesia to be due to an “anomaly of
Gemeingefühl” (Griesinger, 1845, p. 65).
In early German and French psychiatry,
changes in self-feeling were seen as the core
of melancholia or lypémanie, the concep-
tual precursors of depression. Reporting
about patients that “complained almost in
the same terms of a lack of sensations,
[. . .] to them it was a total lack of feel-
ings, as if they were dead,” Albert Zeller
had explained their symptoms as a disor-
der “self-awareness,” of “Gemeingefühl” or
“self-feeling” (Zeller, 1838, pp. 522–525).
Friedrich Schäfer classified similar
observations as a subtype of melancholia,
naming this subtype Melancholia anaes-
thetica: “when these patients complain
about their suffering, they relate it explic-
itly to a sort of emptiness, hollowness in
their head, or in the pit of their stomach; of
a discomfort of not reaching the surround-
ings with their inner selves. They see and
hear everything, but without experienc-
ing any representation or feeling of their
inner stirrings, of their sensory vividness”
(Schäfer, 1880, p. 242).
Published in the same year as
Feuchtersleben’s textbook, also Gotthilf
Heinrich Schubert’s “Diseases and
Disorders of the Human Soul” explained,
that it would be “the self-feeling of
the melancholic that is tarnished and
impaired” – a distortion that robs the
melancholic of every energy to entertain
any wantings, and this while having full
insight into his own misery;” a state that
Schubert called “paralyzing melancholia”
(Schubert, 1845, p. 303).
In France, Jean-Étienne Esquirol blew
long in the very same horn: “An abyss,
they say, separates them from the external
world, I hear, I see, I touch, say many lype-
maniacs, but I am not as I formerly was.
Objects do not come to me, they do not
identify themselves with my being; a thick
cloud, a veil changes the hue and aspect of
objects” (Esquirol, 1838, p. 414).
Taking a description of a similar state in
Amiel’s “Journal Intime,” Ludovic Dugas
coined the term “depersonalization” in
1898, initiating a rich debate about the cor-
rect phenomenological description, classi-
fication and biological underpinnings of
these symptoms of emotional numbing,
anomalous body experience, anomalous
subjective recall and alienation from one’s
surroundings (Dugas and Moutier, 1911;
Sierra and Berrios, 1997).
In the light of the complaints so often
uttered by depressed patients that they
“feel nothing,” that they are no more
than “a corpse,” or even to “be dead,” it
was Jules Cotard who especially focused
on these symptoms of anomalous corpo-
ral experience - ranging from somatosen-
sory distortions, feelings of disembodi-
ment up to the loss of body owner-
ship feelings - in his 1880 lecture “On
hypochondriacal delusions in a severe
form of anxious melancholia,” later on
called “délire de negation” – délire how-
ever being a complex of emotional, voli-
tional and intellectual symptoms and not
a delusion in the sense of a false idea or
thought or disordered thinking (Cotard,
1880, 1882).
Findings of modern neuropsychiatric
research also speak for a biological founda-
tion of these symptoms, probably involving
a down regulation of the amygdale because
of stress induced hyperactivity in the
orbito-frontal cortex (Sierra and Berrios,
1998). Whatever the complete and cor-
rect biological explanation of the impair-
ment of self-feeling seen in the emotional
numbing and the related inability to color
experience with feelings, these affective
changes in depressive illness seem to per-
tain to a very basic affective dimension
of self-feeling, as many autobiographic
patient narratives and memoirs illustrate
in drastic terms (see, e.g., Styron, 1990;
Kuiper, 1995; Thompson, 1996; Solomon,
2001; Brampton, 2008; see also Ratcliffe,
2008).
The utter strangeness and distance
from everyday experience of these symp-
toms encountered in severe melancholic
depression is what can present a real
challenge in treating depression. Such a
complete loss of emotional colouring –
a colouring taken for granted in our
everyday lives – is almost impossible to
imagine. Moreover, it seems not to be a
result of a narrative or cognitive evalua-
tion. Consequently, it cannot, so to say,
be discussed away. Therefore, these severe
depressive symptoms might remain quite
resistant to psychotherapy, especially cog-
nitive psychotherapy, but show most often
relievable by somatic therapies as medica-
tion or electro-convulsive therapy (APA,
2001, 2010).
CONCLUSION
Romantic psychiatry knew of a notion of
“self-feeling” as referring to a pre-reflective
affective form of self-awareness that is the
foundation of a person’s mood and tem-
per and with these of her motivational,
evaluative and practical perspective on the
world (vgl. Slaby, 2012). In contrast to
its remote ramifications with terms such
as “self-confidence” or “self-esteem,” “self-
feeling” also encompassed the opposite
of self-confidence, i.e., states of low self-
esteem, self-depreciation, submissiveness
and the like and was thought to originate
in a very basic somatic organismic dimen-
sion: a quite basic feeling of vitality or
“vital tone” of a person’s existence. A feel-
ing so basic and seen as granted that only
loss of or change in it - as in depression -
might remind of its existence.
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